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Abstract 
In the absence of significant greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation, many analysts project that 
atmospheric concentrations of species identified for control in the Kyoto protocol could exceed 1000 
ppm (carbon-dioxide-equivalent) by 2100 from the current levels of about 435 ppm. This could lead 
to global average temperature increases of between 2.5° and 6° C by the end of the century. There 
are risks of even greater warming given that underlying uncertainties in emissions projections and 
climate response are substantial. Stabilization of GHG concentrations that would have a reasonable 
chance of meeting temperature targets identified in international negotiations would require 
significant reductions in GHG emissions below “business-as-usual” levels, and indeed from present 
emissions levels. Nearly universal participation of countries is required, and the needed investments 
in efficiency and alternative energy sources would entail significant costs. Resolving how these 
additional costs might be shared among countries is critical to facilitating a wide participation of 
large-emitting countries in a climate stabilization policy. The 2°C target is very ambitious given 
current atmospheric concentrations and inertia in the energy and climate system. The Copenhagen 
pledges for 2020 still keep the 2°C target within a reach, but very aggressive actions would be 
needed immediately after that. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This policy note discusses projected GHG emissions paths that are potentially consistent with 
alternative targets for ultimately stabilizing the global climate system at lowest economic cost 
and under alternative scenarios for country participation in pricing regimes. There is 
considerable uncertainty surrounding future emissions paths, given that different models make 
very different assumptions about future emissions growth (in the absence of policy), the cost and 
availability of emissions-reducing technologies, and so on. Nonetheless, projections from the 
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models still provide decision makers with some broad sense of the appropriate scale of (near 
term and more distant) emissions prices that are consistent with alternative climate stabilization 
scenarios and how much these policies cost.  
The next section discusses where we might be headed in the absence of mitigation policy, in 
terms of future GHG emissions trends, what these imply for the growth of atmospheric GHG 
concentrations and, ultimately, for the amount of likely warming over this century. We also 
discuss the benefits of different stabilization targets for atmospheric GHG accumulations in 
terms of potentially avoided warming. Section 3 discusses projected emissions pricing, and the 
costs of mitigation policies, to meet stabilization targets in the ideal (but unlikely) event of early 
and full global cooperation and with efficient pricing across all emissions sources and over time. 
Section 4 discusses the implications of delayed emissions reductions by all countries, or just 
developing countries. Recent emissions reduction pledges by country governments are briefly 
evaluated in light of the climate stabilization goals. Section 5 discusses the distributional burden 
of mitigation costs across countries and the potential complications for negotiation of long-term 
climate policy. A final section offers some thoughts on pragmatic policy steps in the near term. 
2. WHERE ARE WE HEADED IN THE ABSENCE OF CLIMATE POLICY? 
Climate change may pose substantial risks to natural and human systems (IPCC, 2007). In 
the absence of a policy that targets a reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, projected 
“likely” temperature increases by the end of the century are in the range of 2.4° - 6.4°C above 
pre-industrial levels. The IPCC defines “likely” as a 66% chance or greater (IPCC, 2007).1 A 
recent MIT study with updated climate and socioeconomic parameters provide even higher 
values:  a 90% range of 3.8° - 7°C with a mean value of 5.2°C (Sokolov et al, 2009).  
There are many efforts to project future emissions trends and the range of projections over 
the 21st century is wide. GDP and population growth are major determinants of emissions 
growth, while increases in energy efficiency (e.g., cars with an ability to drive longer distances 
per unit of fuel, or buildings that require less energy to heat them) and increasing costs of fossil 
fuels had the opposing effect on emissions. Most likely, economic growth will remain a major 
factor in driving up emissions, whereas the role of population will slowly fade over time as most 
population projections forecast a stabilization of the world population in the second half of the 
                                                 
1 To date, temperatures are estimated to have risen by approximately 0.75°C relative to pre-industrial (year 1750) 
levels. 
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21st century. What differs most across forecasting models, hence causing the uncertainty 
affecting projections, are the assumptions concerning future GDP growth; the availability of 
fossil resources; the pace and direction of technical change, in turn affecting the cost of low-
carbon technologies and the energy intensity of the economy; and behavioral shifts, affecting 
energy demand.  Whether or not the world undertakes significant policy directed toward 
reducing GHG emissions is an additional uncertainty on top of various economic forces that will 
play out over the century. 
In the absence of a climate stabilization policy, energy-related CO2 emissions (the primary 
GHG) are projected to increase substantially during the 21st century. Figure 1 shows the range of 
projections in a recent model comparison exercise organized by Energy Modeling Forum, EMF 
222 (Clarke et al, 2009).3 On average, fossil fuel CO2 emissions grow from about 30 Gt 
(Gigatonne) CO2 in 2000 to almost 100 Gt CO2 by 2100. 
The contribution of different regions to global emissions is more stable across models. 
OECD countries contribute 15-25% to total emissions in 2100. The USA continues as one of the 
main emitters among the OECD countries. However, its projected global emissions share 
decreases from the current 25% to 10% by the end of the century. A major role of BRIC (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China) countries is foreseen, contributing by 2050 around 45-50% of total 
fossil CO2 emissions. Consistently across models, at least 25% of the total emissions are 
attributed to China from 2020 onward. India, now accounting for 10% of global emissions, 
reaches on the order of 15% by mid-century. The rest of the developing world is projected to 
have an increasing role, moving from 17-25% of total emissions to 25-40%.  
                                                 
2 The EMF 22 International Scenarios engaged ten of the world's leading integrated assessment models (IAMs) to 
focus on the combined implications of different long terms stabilization targets, the possibility for transitory 
overshooting of those targets, and that of partial versus complete country participation. Four of the IAMs 
participated with two alternative versions for a total of 14 models. 
3 The range in Figure 1 does not represent the full uncertainty in the models projections, rather it shows a range of 
the median projections from each model. 
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Figure 1. Energy-Related CO2 emissions projections over 21st century.  
Source: Authors’ calculations drawing from the EMF 22 dataset. 
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions are mostly energy-related, with a contribution from industrial 
processes (mostly cement production) and land use change. Over time, energy-related emissions 
are projected to grow faster than other emissions. While CO2 is a major contributor towards 
global warming, other greenhouse gases (GHGs) also play a substantial role, especially methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and a group of so-called F-gases (HFCs, PFCs, and SF6)4. Currently, 
non-CO2 gases contribute about 25% of total GHG emissions in warming equivalents over their 
atmospheric life span (IPCC, 2007). CO2 emissions are projected to grow faster than non-CO2 
emissions over the 21st century. Among CO2 emissions, land use emissions are also an important 
part of the story. The latest IPCC report estimates that destruction of tropical forests and peat 
lands contributed 18% of global anthropogenic GHG emissions in 2004. Emissions from 
deforestation come primarily from a subset of tropical countries, like Brazil, Indonesia, and some 
countries in Central and Western Africa. Reduced deforestation in these countries and 
reforestation of temperate regions could contribute to mitigation efforts. 
Emissions projections, absent significant policy, show continued rapid increases in global 
concentrations of GHGs.  The EMF-22 scenarios discussed above result in CO2-equivalent 
concentrations of 800-1500 parts per million (ppm) by 2100 counting concentrations of the gases 
identified for control in the Kyoto protocol, up from 420 ppm in 2000. Other substances will also 
affect future climate. These include the CFCs, whose emissions are largely phased out under the 
                                                 
4 The major sources of F-gases are air conditioning, semiconductor production, electrical switchgear, aluminum and 
magnesium production. 
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Montreal Protocol, but that remain in the atmosphere as a powerful contribution to warming, and 
other short lived substances some of which are warming (e.g., ozone and particulates) and some 
cooling (e.g., sulfates). Prinn et al (2011) evaluated the climate impacts of all of these substances 
from a range of scenarios in the literature, including those developed by intergovernmental 
panels (represented by IPCC), national governments (selected scenarios from the U.S. 
government Climate Change Science Program, US CCSP), and industry (represented by Royal 
Dutch Shell Plc). In the no-climate-policy scenarios, the CO2-equivalent concentrations of GHG 
reach up to 1780 ppm. The Prinn et al (2011) study finds global temperature increases of 4.5 to 
7°C increase above present by 2100 in the absence of climate policy (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Increase in global mean temperature in degrees Centigrade (relative to 
2000; CCSP scenarios in green, SRES in blue, Shell in red).  
Source: Prinn et al (2011). 
The study included scenarios where decisions about global energy use were shaped by 
concerns about the environment. As IPCC SRES scenarios have story lines instead of explicit 
representation of the policies, their scenarios A1FI, A1B, and A2 can be interpreted as those 
where concerns of climate change have not significantly shaped energy policy. The same is true 
for the Shell’s “Scramble” scenario. US CCSP has a specific no-climate-policy scenario, denoted 
by “REF” on Figure 2. The risks associated with these levels of temperature increase are not 
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fully understood. However, existing scientific knowledge (IPCC, 2007) justifies at least slowing 
down the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. 
The figure also includes the temperature results for some scenarios shaped by climate 
concerns. The set from the US CCSP developed emissions scenarios (Level 1-4) were formulated 
in terms of radiative forcing5 that intended to avoid exceeding specific CO2 concentration targets 
– 450, 550, 650, 750 ppm against a scenario without explicit policy (REF)6. The Shell’s 
“Blueprints” and “Blueprints without carbon capture and storage (blue_excl CCS)” and the IPCC 
B1 scenarios do not include specific global concentration targets but they are scenarios where 
energy choices are shaped by climate change concerns. These scenarios where energy choices 
are shaped by climate concerns maintain global temperature increases to a range of just under 
2C to under 4C above present through 2100. 
3. CLIMATE STABILIZATION WITH A GLOBAL PARTICIPATION OF 
COUNTRIES 
Stabilization of GHG concentrations at levels often discussed in international negotiations 
requires very substantial emissions cuts. Figure 3 illustrates the difficulty of reaching some 
proposed targets, as some stringent targets are already exceeded or will be exceeded in the not-
so-distant future. As can be seen, the world has already almost passed the often-discussed 450 
CO2e target for the Kyoto Protocol gases7. 
                                                 
5 Radiative forcing is the difference between incoming and outgoing radiation energy; the metric for radiative 
forcing is watt per square meter. 
6 In some cases targets might be expressed in terms of concentration of CO2 only (in ppm of CO2), in others targets 
include all GHGs, hence are expressed in terms ppm of CO2 equivalent, or CO2e.  
7 It is important to distinguish between the concentrations of all GHGs and a subset of the Kyoto gases. In 2010, 
Kyoto gases concentration was about 440 ppm CO2e, while for all GHGs concentration was around 465 ppm 
CO2e. 
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Figure 3. Relationship between different CO2e concentration targets (Kyoto gases) 
and concentrations in the no-policy projections.  
Source: EMF-22 (Clarke et al, 2009). 
Yet, what are the economic costs of achieving substantial reductions?  These depend on who 
participates and the efficiency of the policies used to achieve reductions. We start by reporting 
the costs and consequences of climate stabilization assuming a so called “first-best” world, with 
full international participation, a perfect international carbon market including all GHGs and 
foresight of future climate obligations. In reality, departures from all or many of these 
assumptions are likely to occur and would result in potentially higher economic penalties and 
inefficiencies of various kinds. Nonetheless such an ideal case is useful to understanding the 
basic dynamics of the system, and to have a benchmark for the discussion of more realistic cases. 
It is important to distinguish between who is incurring the cost of mitigation from who is 
actually implementing mitigating activities. For example, mitigation can happen in developing 
countries, but it can be financed with some offset scheme financed by developed countries. 
Allocating internationally a given amount (typically determined by the stabilization target) of 
allowable emissions is going to affect the cost and who pays. This distributional issue would be 
extremely relevant both in the case of taxes and in that of permits. There are many ways to 
distribute the shares of emissions reduction among participating countries. One can propose 
reductions based on equal percent reduction, or GDP per capita, or population, or emissions 
intensity, or historical responsibility, or many other alternative ways. There is vast literature that 
analyzes these types of burden-sharing schemes. As any of the schemes benefit (or imposes the 
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cost on) countries unevenly in different aspects of socio-economic indicators, there is no unique 
formula that would satisfy all participating countries. It is sometimes argued that in order to 
reach global economic efficiency (i.e., reaching a target at a lowest global economic cost), 
emissions should be priced at same rate across different countries. This can be achieved by 
imposing the same GHG price across the countries through a system of carbon taxes, or by 
allowing a full trade in emissions permits among all countries and all sectors of the economy8. 
3.1 Emissions and Emissions Prices  
Emission reductions and carbon prices results for the different models and under the different 
targets are reported in Table 1. In the EMF-22 exercise the global carbon price in 2020 that 
would be in line with a 650 ppm CO2e9 target ranges between $3 and $20 per metric ton of CO2 
(in year 2005 dollars). Carbon price increases to 10-52 2005$/tCO2 when considering 550 ppm 
CO2e target. Allowing for overshooting the target and then bringing back emissions to the 550 
ppm target by the end of the century, would bring the price in 2020 down to 4-51 2005$/tCO2. 
When considering the 450 ppm CO2e target only two models find a solution for the target when 
no overshoot is allowed; for these two models, the price is above 100 2005$/tCO2. When 
overshooting is considered, half of the models are able to find a solution with the price of carbon 
ranges between 15-263 2005$/tCO2.  
 
Table 1. Change in CO2 emissions and price of carbon in 2020. Source: Authors’ elaboration of 
the EMF-22 dataset. 
 Change in CO2 
Emissions in 2020 
relative to 2000 
Change in CO2 
Emissions in 2050 
relative to 2000 
Price of Carbon in 2020 
(2005 USD per ton C)* 
450 ppm CO2e 
(36% of models) 
-67% to 31% -13% to -92% 15-263 2005 USD ton C 
550 ppm CO2e -4% to 50% -67 % to 52% 4-52 2005 USD ton C 
650 ppm CO2e 30% to 57% -16% to 108% 3-20 2005 USD ton C 
*Ranges included the overshoot and not-to-exceed cases. 
                                                 
8 Emissions trading may, for some countries, lead to a decrease in welfare (or total macroeconomic consumption) 
due to the terms-of-trade effect. For a discussion, see Babiker et al (2004). A discussion of a similar potential 
welfare worsening in presence of externalities (e.g., energy taxes) can be found in Paltsev et al (2007). 
9 As we are reviewing the “first best” world we are assuming that all GHGs are taxed. Hence, we use the CO2 
equivalency to aggregate all GHGs. 
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The reason why models are less capable of finding a feasible set of actions for more stringent 
targets resides in the fact that we are already very near to 450 ppm CO2e. Staying below 450 
ppm CO2e would require an immediate and almost complete de-carbonization of the economy. 
This, under realistic assumptions, is likely to be technically unfeasible. Similarly, going back to 
the target after overshooting implies large deployment of negative emissions technologies. Not 
all models envision the deployment of technologies enabling us to remove CO2 from the 
atmosphere (for example, biomass power generation coupled with CO2 capture and storage). 
These technologies deployed at a massive scale would allow bringing down concentrations 
emission pathways later in the century10. 
As the “first best” assumption allows for the full trading in emissions permits, the 2020 
carbon price will increase over time at a discount rate because of perfect substitutability of 
trading in emissions permits and other financial instruments. Different modeling groups assume 
different discount rates, usually in the range of 3-5%, so the carbon price would also increase 
over time at the same rate. 
Looking at emission reductions needed to be in line with the different targets (first and 
second column in Table 1) it is important to notice that, for the near- and medium-term, there is 
not much difference in appropriate emission prices for 550 and 650 ppm—but very large 
emission reductions are required, even in the short run for the 450 ppm CO2e scenario. 
3.2 Policy Costs 
The carbon price might be a misleading indicator for the economic cost of climate policy as it 
does not univocally translate in macroeconomic or welfare impacts. (For a detailed discussion, 
see, for example, Appendix B in Paltsev et al, 2009). Indeed economists usually measure the cost 
in terms of welfare loss (or loss in consumption measured as equivalent variation, that roughly 
can be interpreted as the macroeconomic combination of the cost of producing with more 
efficient technologies, or cleaner but more expensive fuels, the forgone benefits to households 
from cutting back on energy use, etc.). GDP loss is another popular measure for the cost of a 
                                                 
10 Currently, these negative carbon technologies are highly speculative. For a discussion concerning the potential 
role of bioenergy and carbon capture and storage technologies on the costs of stringent policy see Tavoni and 
Tol (2010). For a discussion about potential technological and economic obstacles for air capture technologies 
see Ranjan (2010). 
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policy, as many of the models used for climate policy analysis do not report welfare11. Most of 
the studies focus on emissions mitigation costs as climate benefits and potential ancillary non-
climate benefits of GHG mitigation are much more uncertain. 
EMF-22 reports the net present value of GDP costs (discounted at 5%) in the range of $2-24 
trillion (year 2005 US dollars) for 650 ppm CO2e stabilization, in the range of $16-45 trillion 
2005$ for 550 ppm CO2e stabilization, and $55-125 trillion 2005$ for 450 ppm CO2e 
stabilization (losses as shares of the world GDP in net present value are discussed in the next 
section). 
US CCSP (Clarke et al, 2007) does also report the cost of climate policy as a percentage 
reduction in the global GDP, but rather than net present values, reports the loss in different 
periods of time. The most stringent stabilization level in this study is roughly equal to 550 ppm 
CO2e (450 ppm when only CO2 contributions are considered). The loss of the world GDP in 
comparison to a scenario with no climate policy is in the range of 1-4% in 2040 and 1-16% in 
2100. 
Emissions pricing will induce emissions reductions in the sectors where these reductions are 
cheapest. Models have different views about the timing of emissions reduction, but most of the 
projections agree that the power generation sector will be the first area where less-carbon-
emitting (e.g., natural gas) or almost-zero-carbon-emitting technologies (e.g., nuclear, hydro, 
renewables) are introduced because of various economic substitutes that already exist in this 
sector12. Less-emitting technologies in transportation (e.g., gasoline/electric hybrid vehicles, 
more fuel efficient conventional vehicles) and energy-saving technologies in buildings and 
industry are also promising, but currently look more expensive. Substantial reductions in GHG 
emissions in agriculture and cement production are also costly, but to achieve climate 
stabilization, emissions from all sectors of the economy need to be reduced drastically. For more 
stringent climate stabilization targets, the reductions are needed to begin in the near future, and if 
the models are correct, some very ambitious targets (i.e., 450 ppm CO2e) might be already out of 
reach. Previous economic analyses have estimated that there may be significant and relatively 
inexpensive and cost effective opportunities for protecting and enhancing global forest carbon 
                                                 
11 As GDP measures not only consumption, but also government spending, investment and net trade, it is a less 
satisfactory indicator of cost of a policy. For additional discussion, see Appendix B in Paltsev et al (2009). 
12 Jacoby et al (2012) provide an assessment of the role of natural gas in a potential U.S. climate policy considering 
recent shale gas development. 
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stocks. Linking REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation) could 
be extremely beneficial as it is a low cost carbon abatement opportunity, although several 
implementation issues would need to be overcome. Deforestation mitigation could lower the 
total costs of climate stabilization policies by around 10-25% depending on the policy scenario, 
and could enable additional reductions of about 20 ppm CO2e with no added costs compared to 
an energy-sector only policy (Bosetti et al, 2011). However, most of rainforest countries have 
not yet developed the implementation capacity for monitoring and enforcing country scale 
projects and this might diminish the role of REDD in the next decade.  
Deferring the bulk of mitigation action to later periods can make sense if we are optimistic 
about the availability, cost and speed of deployment of low-emissions technologies. A further 
degree of freedom is represented by negative emissions technologies. However, relying on a 
technological future which might not evolve as expected comes at a risk of missing the target 
completely. 
4. INCOMPLETE PARTICIPATION AND DELAYED ACTION 
Carbon prices as well as mitigation costs depend critically on assumptions about 
(1) innovation and the availability of low-carbon alternatives to conventional fossil fuels, 
(2) flexibility of substitution within the energy-economic system, (3) the credibility of future 
policies that triggers long term investments and (4) the immediate action of all countries or of 
major emitters. In this section we investigate the latter crucial assumption and how it might 
influence results presented so far. 
For a given stabilization target, delayed global action implies a higher post peak reduction 
rate. Short term inaction would then result in a required pace of de-carbonization so rapid that 
replacement of capital would need to be abrupt and very costly. Only under the optimistic 
assumption of large-scale CO2 removal, the tradeoff between costs and timing of action can be 
less severe. If the world continues according to business-as-usual until 2030, stabilization at 550 
ppm CO2e will no longer be possible, according to most models. The target might still be 
feasible if ambitious mitigation policies at global scale are postponed until 2020, but this delay 
could substantially scale up global mitigation cost. Climate policy aiming at 450 ppm CO2e 
target leaves even less leeway for a delay of cooperative mitigation action (Edenhofer et al, 
2009). 
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Rather than complete global inaction, more likely we will face asymmetry of actions across 
world regions. Significant mitigation actions are planned to take place in some developed 
countries within the next decade (e.g., the EU has committed to the 20% reduction below 1990 
levels target by 2020). However, it is unlikely that emerging economies will make substantial 
emissions reductions in the coming decade. This asymmetric participation will most likely 
increase the global costs of those stabilization scenarios that remain feasible; some of the more 
stringent targets may not be feasible.  
Inaction in developing countries clashes with the fact that the bulk of emissions in the next 
decades will be coming from non-OECD countries. If CO2 emissions are not regulated in some 
major emitting countries, two inefficiencies arise: (1) static inefficiency, as mitigation does not 
take place where mitigation costs are lowest, and (2) dynamic inefficiency, as unregulated 
countries are those where most of the new investments will take place. Investing instead in fossil 
technologies, fast growing countries eventually lock-in in these long-lived technologies (e.g., a 
new coal plant may be in use for 50 years) and later conversion to low-carbon technologies 
becomes more costly, or simply impossible if early scrapping is deemed unfeasible. Finally, non-
participating countries might react to lower fossil fuel prices, deriving from the contraction in the 
demand, and increase their emissions, thus partially offsetting the environmental benefit of early 
movers. One solution frequently pointed out by economists is the use of incentive systems (as for 
example an evolution of the Clean Development Mechanism) to induce reductions in developing 
countries while limiting leakage. (See Bosetti and Frankel, 2009, for a detailed discussion of 
political feasibility of alternative targets.) 
For a more detailed discussion, we report again results from the latest Energy Modeling 
Forum exercise (EMF-22, Clarke et al, 2009) that looked extensively into the issue of asymmetry 
of participation to a climate agreement and how this would affect the feasibility of stabilization 
scenarios as well as the costs. Figure 4 reports the results in terms of percentage of loss in the 
world GDP (in net present value) for different models, different targets, different emission 
pathways (including and excluding overshooting), and for different levels of participation (full 
and delayed). 
The key result, consistent across models, is that the 450 ppm CO2e stabilization scenarios are 
basically unfeasible if only the OECD coalition immediately undertake mitigation action while 
BRICs and the rest of the world remain on their business-as-usual path until 2030 and 2050, 
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respectively. Half of the models cannot find a feasible set of investment actions for the 550 ppm 
CO2e scenario as well, when participation of developing countries is delayed. Overshooting 
becomes critical for the feasibility of this intermediate target and the price of carbon that OECD 
countries face in 2020 increases on average, by a factor of three. There is a wide range of 
disagreement across models, depending on assumptions about flexibility of substitution across 
technologies and, once more, on the assumptions concerning the availability of negative 
emissions technologies (green versus blue markers in Figure 4 distinguish models with and 
without bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECS) technologies).  
 
Figure 4. Policy costs for the EMF22 data set by model run. Green colors indicate 
models with BECS and blue models without BECS. FP=full, immediate 
participation of Developing Countries, DP=delayed participation of Developing 
Countries. STAB=target not to exceed, OS=target can be overshot.  
Source: Tavoni and Tol, 2010. 
More generally, the set of technologies that will be available and the speed at which they will 
be deployed significantly affect not only the costs of any climate policy, but also the time we can 
wait without entering an irreversible path. The stricter the climate objective or the later the 
mitigation effort starts, the more we will need to resort to technologies which have potential 
implications that we have not yet fully understood. This obviously requires a careful and realistic 
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estimation of the costs and potentials of these technologies, the research development and 
demonstration requirements to make them available with a reasonable level of certainty, and the 
potential barriers and external costs that might be linked to their deployment on a large-scale. 
How do projections we have discussed so far compare with the current state of climate 
negotiations? Instead of an ideal global system, countries agreed on submitting their “pledges” 
during the meetings in Copenhagen in 2009 and Cancun in 2010, where most of developed 
countries submitted their emissions reductions targets relative to emissions in 1990, 2000, or 
200513. Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia, South Africa and South Korea proposed the reductions 
relative to their business-as-usual emissions14, and China and India submitted carbon intensity 
reduction targets (i.e., CO2 emissions per unit of GDP). Some of the pledges have conditions 
attached, such as the provision of finance and technology or ambitious actions from other 
countries; some pledges were provided as ranges. This leads to a degree of freedom in their 
implementation and a range of potential outcomes rather than a single estimate.15 
The implications of these pledges for 2020 global emissions will hence depend on what 
pledges are implemented and what rules will be applied. Many scientific groups have estimated 
global emissions in 2020 based on the Copenhagen Accord pledges. The 2010 Emission Gap 
Report (den Elzen et al, 2010) collects these estimates and shows that, on one hand, emissions in 
2020 could be as low as 49 GtCO2e (range: 47-51 GtCO2e) when countries implement their 
conditional pledges in their more stringent declination. On the other hand, they could be as high 
as 53 GtCO2e (range: 52-57 GtCO2e) when countries implement unconditional pledges in their 
more lenient declination. 
Emission pathways consistent with a “likely” chance of meeting the 2°C limit generally peak 
before 2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO2e (range: 39-44 GtCO2e), have steep 
emission reductions afterwards and/or reach negative emissions in the longer term. Hence, the 
ranges implied by Copenhagen pledges do not necessarily rule out the 2°C target, as the two 
ranges are not severely distant from one another. However, as previously discussed, the larger 
the overshoot will be, the faster the de-carbonization in the second half of the century will be 
needed, with all the implications that we have discussed above. 
                                                 
13 Typical targets for developed regions like the U.S., EU, Canada, Japan are in the range of 20 % GHG reduction 
relative to 2000 levels. 
14 Targets expressed with respect to baseline emissions are particularly tricky as they can be interpreted in very 
different ways depending on the baseline projection adopted. 
15 The reader is referred to the UNEP website for an overview of all pledges http://www.unep.org/climatepledges/ 
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The consideration that the 2° C target could be out of reach should not be a reason for 
inaction. Even limited actions towards reducing GHG concentrations result in a substantial 
reduction in risk of exceeding a certain temperature threshold. Table 2 (adapted from Webster 
et al, 2009) illustrates the benefits of at least some mitigation actions in comparison to the no-
action scenario. For example, stabilization at 800 ppm reduces the probability of exceeding 4°C 
in 2100 to 7% from 85% in the no-policy scenario. Therefore, even a limited action directed at 
GHG reductions by a subset of regions will appreciably reduce the probability of more extreme 
levels of temperature increase. 
 
Table 2. Cumulative probability of global average surface warming from 2000 to 
2100 (400 MIT IGSM forecasts per case). Source: Adapted from Webster et al 
(2009). 
 
5. WHO BEARS THE COSTS OF ABATEMENT? 
As discussed in the previous section, the current state of climate negotiations does not give 
high hopes for universal participation. When regions or economic sectors are excluded, the costs 
of meeting the global target are higher in participating countries for any given emission target. 
When policy instruments deviate from an idealized economy-wide GHG tax or pricing, the costs 
of meeting a target also increase substantially. (For a discussion when GHG pricing or cap-and-
trade system is replaced with renewable energy requirements, see, for example, Morris et al, 
16 
 
2010.) Absent near universal participation, stringent climate stabilization goals are quite costly or 
not achievable, because economic activity and emissions would shift to nations that do not sign 
the agreement16. Even with all nations taking on commitments, the policies would require a 
complex system of financial transfers to simultaneously satisfy widely-discussed burden-sharing 
goals. Ultimately, differences in the costs of abatement between countries will depend on their 
energy, industrial and agricultural systems (that would determine marginal costs of abatement in 
the sectors), emissions allocations, policy instruments, and financial transfers. 
Two interacting equity concerns would have to be dealt with in seeking the global emissions 
goal. First, incentives and compensation for developing country participation will be required, 
consistent with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Second, since 
mitigation costs and compensation payments by developed countries will be substantial, they 
also will need to find an acceptable burden-sharing arrangement among themselves. Simple 
emissions reduction rules are incapable of dealing with the highly varying circumstances of 
different countries.  
Successful climate negotiations will need to be grounded in a full understanding of the 
substantial amounts at stake. For example, for 50% global emissions reductions by 2050 relative 
to 2000, Jacoby et al (2009) show that if developing countries (including China and India) are 
fully compensated for the costs of mitigation in the period to 2050, then the average welfare cost 
to developed countries is around 2% of GDP in 2020 (relative to reference level), rising to 10% 
in 2050. The implied financial transfers are large—over $400 billion per year in 2020 and rising 
to around $3 trillion in 2050. The United States’ share of these transfers is $200 billion in 2020, 
and over a trillion dollars in 205017.  
With less than full compensation the welfare burden on developing countries would rise, but 
the international financial transfers would remain at unprecedented scale. It is an extreme 
assumption that developing countries will demand complete compensation. If, as is likely, they 
are willing to bear some costs, then the welfare burden on the developed countries will be 
reduced. Also, the burden is lowered somewhat if compensation only covers direct mitigation 
                                                 
16 Most studies report carbon leakage from the Kyoto Protocol targets being in the range of 5-15%. For a discussion 
of estimates of carbon leakage, see IPCC (2007) section 11.7.2.1 at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch11s11-7-2-1.html  
17 Given large budget deficits at present, these transfers seem even more unrealistic. Even one of the Copenhagen 
Accord goals of $100 billion per year by 2020 for climate financing from “a wide variety of sources” seems 
quite questionable at this point, which illustrates a degree of difficulty to reach a global agreement when 
developing countries are expecting to get help with GHG emissions mitigation. 
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costs and not other losses associated with the policy, as might come through terms-of-trade 
effects. In the process the required financial transfers are reduced as well, but they remain 
large18. 
In general, the cost of mitigation is higher in energy-exporting countries, while energy-
importers have some counter-effects in terms-of-trade due to lower fossil fuel prices that allow 
them to reduce the cost of participation. The welfare costs can be both substantial and wildly 
different across regions depending on the allocation methods and policy instruments chosen19. 
What makes matters worse is that climate change related damages vary wildly as well but in a 
very different way, adding up to the complexity of the problem. For success in dealing with the 
climate threat, any negotiation of long-term goals and paths to achievement need to be grounded 
in a full understanding of the substantial amounts at stake. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Without significant emissions mitigation action, the likely atmospheric temperature increase 
is projected to range between 2.5° and 6°C by the end of the century. The risks associated with 
temperature increases above 2°C are not fully understood. Existing scientific knowledge justifies 
at least slowing down the anthropogenic contribution to climate change. 
In 2000, global GHG emissions were about 40 gigatonnes (Gt); a successful implementation 
of the Copenhagen Accord is expected to result in about 50 Gt in 2020. To be on a 2°C target 
path by 2050, most models project the global emissions in the range of 15-20 Gt. Some models 
envision a development of (still unproven) negative carbon technologies that would allow the 
postponement of some mitigation action. Postponing the mitigation actions, especially in 
emerging countries where large portions of energy capital are being installed for the first time, 
can be very costly. Extra costs associated with the delayed actions increases non-linearly with 
the stringency of the target, and some more stringent targets become infeasible if action is 
postponed. 
To reduce the cost while achieving an equitable sharing of them, decisions about where 
emissions reductions are taken and how they are paid for should be separated. Emission 
mitigation should take place where it is most efficient. Innovation, both on energy efficiency and 
                                                 
18 In this case the annual financial transfers to developing countries are lower by $77 billion in 2020 and by $108 
billion in 2050 (Jacoby et al, 2009). 
19 Higher the deviation from the “first-best” instruments (such as universal carbon taxes), the larger the costs. 
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alternative energy sources, is needed. Carbon pricing (e.g., carbon taxes or a price established 
through a cap and trade system) would provide a signal to trigger both innovation and adoption 
of technologies needed for a low carbon economy. 
Advocates of rapid climate stabilization might be dismayed by some of the harsh technical, 
economic, and practical realities discussed above. Keeping mean projected warming above pre-
industrial levels to 2.0oC, or stabilizing atmospheric GHGs at 450 ppm (about current levels), 
would require rapid widespread international adoption of emissions control policies, and the 
development, and global deployment, of negative emission technologies later in the century to 
reverse atmospheric accumulations, after a period of overshooting the long-term concentration 
target. Even the 550 ppm target (mean projected warming of 2.9oC), is extremely challenging, 
not least because required emissions prices escalate rapidly with further significant delay in 
controlling global GHGs, and the annual transfers to provide some compensation for developing 
countries are large and contentious to design. On the other hand, near-term emissions prices that 
are consistent with the 650 ppm target are more moderate, and delayed action on emissions 
reductions is less serious for this case, though obviously this target entails greater risks of 
dangerous warming.   
The huge uncertainties—surrounding both the extent of climate change associated with a 
given atmospheric concentration target, and our ability to develop technologies that would 
enable a rapid stabilization of the climate if the earth warms up rapidly—point to the importance 
of putting a policy architecture in place in the near term, and delaying decisions about how 
rapidly emissions should be scaled back in the distant future until some of the uncertainties have 
been resolved.   
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